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Abstract
Lehmann, Magidor, and Schlechta developed an approach to
belief revision based on distances between any two valua-
tions. Suppose we are given such a distance D. This defines
an operator |D , called a distance operator, which transforms
any two sets of valuations V and W into the set V |DW of
all those elements of W that are closest to V . This opera-
tor |D defines naturally the revision of K by α as the set of
all formulas satisfied in MK |DMα (i.e. the set of all those
models of α that are closest to the models of K). This con-
stitutes a distance-based revision operator. Lehmann et al.
characterized families of them using a “loop” condition of
arbitrarily big size. An interesting question is whether this
loop condition can be replaced by a finite one. Extending
the results of Schlechta, we will provide elements of negative
answer. In fact, we will show that for families of distance
operators, there is no “normal” characterization. Approxima-
tively, a characterization is normal iff it contains only finite
and universally quantified conditions. Though they are nega-
tive, these results have an interest of their own for they help
to understand more clearly the limits of what is possible in
this area. In addition, we are quite confident that they can be
used to show that for families of distance-based revision oper-
ators, there is no normal characterization either. For instance,
the families of Lehmann et al. might well be concerned with
this, which suggests that their big loop condition cannot be
replaced by a finite and universally quantified condition.
Introduction
Belief revision is the study of how an intelligent agent
may replace its current epistemic state by another one
which is non-trivial and incorporates new information.
In (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, & Makinson 1985), the well-
known AGM approach was proposed. An epistemic state
is modelled there by a deductively closed set of formulas K
and new information by a formula α. A revision operator is
then a function that transforms K and α into a new set of
formulas (intuitively, the revised epistemic state).
One of the contributions of the AGM approach is
that it provides well-known postulates that any rea-
sonable revision operator should satisfy. These pos-
tulates have been defended by their authors. But,
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doubts have been expressed as to their “sound-
ness”, e.g. (Katsuno & Mendelzon 1992), and espe-
cially “completeness”, e.g. (Freund & Lehmann 1994),
(Darwiche & Pearl 1994), (Lehmann 1995), and
(Darwiche & Pearl 1997). In particular, to be accepted,
an operator never needs to put some coherence between
the revisions of two different sets K and K ′. As a
consequence, some operators are accepted though they
are not well-behaved when iterated. In addition, mod-
elling an epistemic state by just a deductively closed
set of formulas has been rejected by many researchers,
e.g. (Boutilier & Goldszmidt 1993), (Boutilier 1993),
(Darwiche & Pearl 1997), (Williams 1994), and
(Nayak et al. 1996). In (Lehmann 1995) and
(Friedman & Halpern 1996), it is argued that this modelling
is not sufficient in many AI applications.
This provides motivations for another approach, based
on distances between any two valuations, introduced
in (Schlechta, Lehmann, & Magidor 1996) and investigated
further in (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001). Their
approach is in line with the AGM modelling of an epis-
temic state, but it defines well-behaved iterated revisions.
More precisely, suppose we have at our disposal a distance
D between any two valuations. This defines an operator |D,
called a distance operator, which transforms any ordered
pair (V,W ) of sets of valuations into the set V |DW of all
those elements of W that are closest to V according to D.
This operator |D defines naturally the revision of K by α
as the set of all formulas satisfied in MK |DMα (i.e. the set
of all those models of α that are closest to the models of K).
This constitutes a distance-based revision operator, which
is interesting for its natural aspect and for it is well-behaved
when iterated. This is due to the fact that the revisions of
the differentK’s are all defined by the same distance, which
ensures a strong coherence between them. Note that this is
not the case with other definitions. For instance, with sphere
systems (Grove 1988) and epistemic entrenchment relations
(Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson 1988), the revision of each K is
defined by a different structure without any “glue” relating
them.
In (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001), several fam-
ilies of distance-based revision operators were character-
ized by the AGM postulates together with new ones that
deal with iterated revisions. However, the latter postulates
include a “loop” condition of arbitrarily big size. An in-
teresting question is whether it can be replaced by a finite
condition. Elements of negative answer were provided in
(Schlechta 2004). Approximatively, Schlechta call normal a
characterization containing only conditions which are finite,
universally quantified (like e.g. the AGM postulates), and
simple (i.e. using only elementary operations like e.g. ∪, ∩,
\). Then, he showed that for families of distance operators,
there is no normal characterization.
Now, there is a strong connexion between the distance op-
erators (which apply to valuations) and the distance-based
revision operators (which apply to formulas). It is quite rea-
sonable to think that the work of Schlechta can be continued
to show that for families of distance-based revision opera-
tors, there is no normal characterization either. The fami-
lies investigated in (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001)
might well be concerned with this, which suggests that the
arbitrarily big loop condition cannot be replaced by a finite,
universally quantified, and simple condition.
The contribution of the present paper is to extend the work
of Schlechta in two directions. First, we will use the word
“normal” in a larger sense. Indeed, we will call normal a
characterization containing only conditions which are finite
and universally quantified, but not necessarily simple (i.e.
the conditions can involve complex structures or functions,
etc., we are not limited to elementary operations). Then, we
will show that the families which Schlechta investigated still
do not admit a normal characterization, in our larger sense.
This is therefore a generalization of his negative results. Sec-
ond, we will extend the negative results (always in our sense)
to new families of distance operators, in particular to some
that respect the Hamming distance.
We are quite confident that the present work can be con-
tinued, like the work of Schlechta, to show that for fami-
lies of distance-based revision operators, there is no normal
characterization either. But, we will cover more families and
with a more general definition of a normal characterization.
This is the main motivation. In addition, the impossibility
results of the present paper already help to understand more
clearly the limits of what is possible in this area. They have
therefore an interest of their own.
First, we will present the distance-based revision and the
characterizations of Lehmann et al. Second, we will define
formally the normal characterizations. Third, we will show
the impossibility results. And finally, we will conclude.
Background
Pseudo-distances
In many circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that an
agent can evaluate for any two valuations v and w, how far
is the situation described by w from the situation described
by v, or how difficult or unexpected the transition from v to
w is, etc. In (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001), this is
modelled by pseudo-distances:
Definition 1 Let V be a set.
D is a pseudo-distance on V iff D = 〈C,≺, d〉, where C is
a non-empty set, ≺ is a strict total order on C, and d is a
function from V × V to C.
Intuitively, V is a set of valuations. Each element of C rep-
resents a “cost”. c ≺ c′ means the cost c is strictly smaller
than the cost c′. And, d(v, w) is the cost of the move from
v to w. Natural properties that come to mind are those of
usual distances. Before introducing them, we need standard
notations:
Notation 2 P denotes the power set operator.
For every set S, |S| denotes the cardinality of S.
N, N
+
, R, and R+ denote respectively the natural, positive
natural, real, and positive real numbers.
Let r ∈ R. Then, abs(r) denotes the absolute value of r.
Let n,m ∈ N. Then, [n,m] denotes the set of every k in N
(not in R) such that n ≤ k ≤ m.
Definition 3 Suppose D = 〈C,≺, d〉 is a pseudo-distance
on a set V .
D is symmetric iff ∀ v, w ∈ V , d(v, w) = d(w, v).
D is identity respecting (IR) iff
(1) C = R;
(2) ≺ is the usual strict total order on R;
(3) ∀ v, w ∈ V , d(v, w) = 0 iff v = w.
D is positive iff (1), (2), and
(4) ∀ v, w ∈ V , 0  d(v, w).
D is triangle-inequality respecting (TIR) iff (1), (2), and
(5) ∀ v, w, x ∈ V , d(v, x)  d(v, w) + d(w, x).
These properties have not been imposed from start because
natural circumstances could then no longer be modelled. For
instance, non-symmetric pseudo-distances are useful when
moving from v to w may be “cheaper” than moving from
w to v. There are also circumstances where staying the
same requires effort and then non-IR pseudo-distances will
be helpful. We can also imagine scenarios where some costs
can be seen as “benefits”, we will then turn to non-positive
pseudo-distances, etc.
In addition, the costs are not required to be necessarily
the real numbers. Indeed, for instance, we could need |N| to
model an “infinite cost” useful when a move is impossible
or extremely difficult. Provided one accepts the infinite cost
|N|, we can define naturally “liberal” versions of identity
respect, positivity, and triangle-inequality respect:
Definition 4 Suppose D = 〈C,≺, d〉 is a pseudo-distance
on a set V .
D is liberally IR iff
(1) C = R ∪ {|N|};
(2) ∀ c, c′ ∈ C, c ≺ c′ iff (c, c′ ∈ R and c < c′) or (c ∈ R
and c′ = |N|);
(3) ∀ v, w ∈ V , d(v, w) = 0 iff v = w.
D is liberally positive iff (1), (2), and
(4) ∀ v, w ∈ V , 0  d(v, w).
D is liberally TIR iff (1), (2), and
(5) ∀ v, w, x ∈ V : if d(v, x), d(v, w), d(w, x) ∈ R, then
d(v, x)  d(v, w) + d(w, x);
if d(v, x) = |N|, then d(v, w) = |N| or d(w, x) = |N|.
The Hamming distance between propositional valuations
has been considered in (Dalal 1988) and investigated further
by many authors. Respecting this distance is an important
property. We need before to present the matrices for a propo-
sitional language (Urquhart 2001):
Definition 5 Let L = 〈A, C〉 be a propositional language
(A denotes the atoms and C the connectives), let F be the
set of all well-formed formulas (wffs) of L, and ∀ ⋄ ∈ C, let
n(⋄) be the arity of ⋄.
M is a matrix on L iff M = 〈T,E, f〉, where T is a set,
E is a non-empty proper subset of T , and f is a function
(whose domain is C) such that ∀ ⋄ ∈ C, f⋄ (i.e. f(⋄)) is a
function from T n(⋄) to T .
v is a M-valuation iff v is a function from F to T such
that ∀ ⋄ ∈ C, ∀ α1, . . . , αn(⋄) ∈ F , v(⋄(α1, . . . , αn(⋄))) =
f⋄(v(α1), . . . , v(αn(⋄))).
Intuitively, T is a set of truth values and E contains all the
designated truth values.
Definition 6 Let L = 〈A, C〉 be a propositional language,
M a matrix on L, V the set of all M-valuations, and D =
〈C,≺, d〉 a pseudo-distance on V .
We use the following notation: ∀ v, w ∈ V ,
h(v, w) := {p ∈ A : v(p) 6= w(p)}.
D is Hamming-inequality respecting (HIR) iff ∀v, w, x ∈ V ,
if |h(v, w)| < |h(v, x)|, then d(v, w) ≺ d(v, x).
Recall that h(v, w) may be infinite and thus < should be
understood as the usual order on the cardinal numbers.
We turn to crucial operators introduced in
(Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001). They are cen-
tral in the definition of the distance-based revision. They
transform any two sets of valuations V and W into the
set of every element w of W such that a global move
from V to w is of minimal cost. Note that concerning
this point, (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001) has its
roots in (Katsuno & Mendelzon 1992) and especially in
(Lewis 1973).
Definition 7 Suppose D = 〈C,≺, d〉 is a pseudo-distance
on a set V .
We denote by |D the binary operator on P(V) such that
∀ V,W ⊆ V , we have V |DW =
{w ∈ W : ∃v ∈ V, ∀v′ ∈ V, ∀w′ ∈W,d(v, w)  d(v′, w′)}.
Distance-based revision operators
The ontological commitments endorsed in
(Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001) are close to
the AGM ones: a classical propositional language is
considered and both epistemic states and new information
are modelled by consistent sets of formulas (not necessarily
deductively closed).
Notation 8 We denote by Lc some classical propositional
language and by ⊢c, Vc, |=c, and Fc respectively the clas-
sical consequence relation, valuations, satisfaction relation,
and wffs of Lc. Let Γ,∆ ⊆ Fc and V ⊆ Vc, then:
Γ ∨∆ := {α ∨ β : α ∈ Γ, β ∈ ∆};
⊢c(Γ) := {α ∈ Fc : Γ ⊢c α};
MΓ := {v ∈ Vc : ∀ α ∈ Γ, v |=c α};
T (V ) := {α ∈ Fc : V ⊆Mα};
C := {Γ ⊆ Fc : ⊢c(Γ) 6= Fc};
D := {V ⊆ Vc : ∃ Γ ⊆ Fc, V = MΓ}.
In this classical framework, two new properties for pseudo-
distances can be defined. They convey natural mean-
ings. Their importance has been put in evidence in
(Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001).
Definition 9 LetD = 〈C,≺, d〉 be a pseudo-distance on Vc.
D is definability preserving (DP) iff
∀ V,W ∈ D, V |DW ∈ D.
D is consistency preserving (CP) iff
∀ V,W ∈ P(Vc) \ {∅}, V |DW 6= ∅.
Now, suppose we are given a pseudo-distance D on Vc.
Then, the revision of a consistent set of formulas Γ by a sec-
ond one ∆ can be defined naturally as the set of all formulas
satisfied in MΓ|DM∆:
Definition 10 Let ⋆ be an operator from C×C to P(Fc).
We say that ⋆ is a distance-based revision operator iff there
exists a pseudo-distanceD on Vc such that ∀ Γ,∆ ∈ C,
Γ ⋆∆ = T (MΓ|DM∆).
In addition, if D is symmetric, IR, DP etc., then so is ⋆.
The authors of (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001)
rewrote the AGM postulates in their framework as follows.
Suppose ⋆ is an operator from C×C to P(Fc) Then, define
the following properties: ∀ Γ,Γ′,∆,∆′ ∈ C,
(⋆0) if ⊢c(Γ) = ⊢c(Γ′) and ⊢c(∆) = ⊢c(∆′),
then Γ ⋆∆ = Γ′ ⋆∆′;
(⋆1) Γ ⋆∆ ∈ C and Γ ⋆∆ = ⊢c(Γ ⋆∆);
(⋆2) ∆ ⊆ Γ ⋆∆;
(⋆3) if Γ ∪∆ ∈ C, then Γ ⋆∆ = ⊢c(Γ ∪∆);
(⋆4) if (Γ ⋆∆) ∪∆′ ∈ C,
then Γ ⋆ (∆ ∪∆′) = ⊢c((Γ ⋆∆) ∪∆′).
Then, it can be checked that every positive, IR, CP and DP
distance-based revision operator ⋆ satisfies (⋆0)-(⋆4), i.e.
the AGM postulates. More importantly, ⋆ satisfies also cer-
tain properties that deal with iterated revisions. This is not
surprising as the revisions of the different Γ’s are all defined
by a unique pseudo-distance, which ensures a strong coher-
ence between them. For example, ⋆ satisfies two following
properties: ∀ Γ,∆, {α}, {β} ∈ C,
• if γ ∈ (Γ ⋆ {α}) ⋆∆ and γ ∈ (Γ ⋆ {β}) ⋆∆,
then γ ∈ (Γ ⋆ {α ∨ β}) ⋆∆;
• if γ ∈ (Γ ⋆ {α ∨ β}) ⋆∆,
then γ ∈ (Γ ⋆ {α}) ⋆∆ or γ ∈ (Γ ⋆ {β}) ⋆∆.
These properties are not entailed by the AGM
postulates, a counter-example can be found in
(Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001). But, they seem in-
tuitively justified. Indeed, take three sequences of revisions
that differ only at some step in which the new information
is α in the first sequence, β in the second, and α ∨ β in the
third. Now, suppose γ is concluded after both the first and
the second sequences. Then, it should intuitively be the case
that γ is concluded after the third sequence too. Similar
arguments can be given for the second property. Now, to
characterize the full distance-based revision more is needed.
This is discussed in the next section.
Characterizations
The authors of (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001) pro-
vided characterizations for families of distance-based revi-
sion operators. They proceed in two steps. First, they de-
fined the distance operators, in a very general framework:
Definition 11 Let V be a set, V,W,X ⊆ P(V), and | an
operator from V×W to X.
| is a distance operator iff there exists a pseudo-distance D
on V such that ∀ V ∈ V, ∀W ∈W, V |W = V |DW .
In addition, if D is symmetric, HIR, DP, etc., then so is |.
Then, they characterized families of such distance operators
(with the least possible assumptions about V, W, and X).
This is the essence of their work. Here is an example:
Proposition 12 (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001)
Suppose V is a non-empty set, V ⊆ P(V) (such that ∅ 6∈ V
and ∀ V,W ∈ V, we have V ∪W ∈ V and if V ∩W 6= ∅,
then V ∩W ∈ V too), and | an operator from V×V to V.
Then, | is a symmetric distance operator iff ∀ k ∈ N+ and
∀ V0, V1, . . . , Vk ∈ V, we have V0|V1 ⊆ V1 and
(|loop) if


(V1|(V0 ∪ V2)) ∩ V0 6= ∅,
(V2|(V1 ∪ V3)) ∩ V1 6= ∅,
. . . ,
(Vk|(Vk−1 ∪ V0)) ∩ Vk−1 6= ∅,
then (V0|(Vk ∪ V1)) ∩ V1 6= ∅.
In a second step only, they applied these results to char-
acterize families of distance-based revision operators. For
instance, they applied Proposition 12 to get Proposition 13
below. We should say immediately that they chose a clas-
sical framework to define the distance-based revision. But,
if we choose now another framework, there are quite good
chances that Proposition 12 can be still applied, thanks to its
algebraic nature.
Proposition 13 (Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001)
Let ⋆ be an operator from C×C to P(Fc).
Then, ⋆ is a symmetric CP DP distance-based revision oper-
ator iff ⋆ satisfies (⋆0), (⋆1), (⋆2), and
∀ k ∈ N+, ∀ Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,Γk ∈ C,
(⋆loop) if


Γ0 ∪ (Γ1 ⋆ (Γ0 ∨ Γ2)) ∈ C,
Γ1 ∪ (Γ2 ⋆ (Γ1 ∨ Γ3)) ∈ C,
. . . ,
Γk−1 ∪ (Γk ⋆ (Γk−1 ∨ Γ0)) ∈ C,
then Γ1 ∪ (Γ0 ⋆ (Γk ∨ Γ1)) ∈ C.
Normal characterizations
Let V be a set, O a set of binary operators on P(V),
and | a binary operator on P(V). Approximatively, in
(Schlechta 2004), a characterization of O is called normal
iff it contains only conditions which are universally quan-
tified, apply | only a finite number of times, and use only
elementary operations (like e.g. ∪, ∩, \), see Section 1.6.2.1
of (Schlechta 2004) for details. Here is an example of such
a condition:
(C1) ∀ V,W ∈ U ⊆ P(V), V |((V ∪W )|W ) = ∅.
Now, we introduce a new, more general, definition with
an aim of providing more general impossibility results. Ap-
proximatively, in the present paper, a characterization of O
will be called normal iff it contains only conditions which
are universally quantified and apply | only a finite number of
times. Then, the conditions can involve complex structures
or functions, etc., we are not limited to elementary opera-
tions. More formally:
Definition 14 Suppose V is a set and O a set of binary op-
erators on P(V).
C is a normal characterization of O iff C = 〈n,Φ〉 where
n ∈ N+ and Φ is a relation on P(V)3n such that for every
binary operator | on P(V), we have | ∈ O iff
∀ V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn ⊆ V ,
(V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|W1, . . . , Vn|Wn) ∈ Φ.
Note that Φ is a relation in the purely set-theoretic sense.
Now, suppose there is no normal characterization ofO. Here
are examples (i.e. (C1), (C2), and (C3) below) that will
give the reader a good idea which conditions cannot charac-
terize O. This will therefore make clearer the range of our
impossibility results (Propositions 15 and 16 below).
To begin, (C1) cannot characterize O. Indeed, suppose it
does, i.e. | ∈ O iff ∀ V,W ∈ U, V |((V ∪W )|W ) = ∅.
Then, take n = 4 and Φ such that
(V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4, X1, . . . , X4) ∈ Φ iff

V1, V2 ∈ U,
V3 = V1 ∪ V2,
W3 = V2,
V4 = V1,
W4 = X3
entail X4 = ∅.
Then, 〈4,Φ〉 is a normal characterization of O. We give the
easy proof of this, so that the reader can check that a con-
venient relation Φ can be found immediately for all simple
conditions like (C1).
Proof Direction: “→”.
Suppose | ∈ O.
Then, ∀ V,W ∈ U, V |((V ∪W )|W ) = ∅.
Let V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4 ⊆ V . We show:
(V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4, V1|W1, . . . , V4|W4) ∈ Φ.
Suppose V1, V2 ∈ U, V3 = V1 ∪ V2, W3 = V2, V4 = V1,
and W4 = V3|W3.
Then, as V1, V2 ∈ U, we get V1|((V1 ∪ V2)|V2) = ∅.
But, V1|((V1 ∪ V2)|V2) = V1|(V3|W3) = V4|W4.
Direction: “←”.
Suppose ∀ V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4 ⊆ V ,
(V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4, V1|W1, . . . , V4|W4) ∈ Φ.
We show | ∈ O. Let V,W ∈ U.
Take V1 = V , V2 = W , V3 = V1 ∪ V2, W3 = V2, V4 = V1,
W4 = V3|W3. Take any values for W1 and W2.
Then, V1 ∈ U, V2 ∈ U, V3 = V1 ∪ V2, W3 = V2, V4 = V1,
and W4 = V3|W3.
But, (V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4, V1|W1, . . . , V4|W4) ∈ Φ
Therefore, by definition of Φ, V4|W4 = ∅.
But, V4|W4 = V1|((V1 ∪ V2)|V2) = V |((V ∪W )|W ).
At this point, we excluded all those conditions which are ex-
cluded by (the nonexistence of a normal characterization of
O in the sense of) Schlecha, i.e. all conditions like (C1).
But actually, more complex conditions are also excluded.
For instance, let f be any function from P(V) to P(V).
Then, the following condition:
(C2) ∀ V,W ∈ U, f(V )|((V ∪W )|W ) = ∅.
cannot characterize O. Indeed, suppose it characterizes O.
Then, take n = 4 and Φ such that
(V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4, X1, . . . , X4) ∈ Φ iff

V1, V2 ∈ U,
V3 = V1 ∪ V2,
W3 = V2,
V4 = f(V1),
W4 = X3
entail X4 = ∅.
Then, 〈4,Φ〉 is a normal characterization ofO. We leave the
easy proof of this to the reader. On the other hand, (C2) is
not excluded by Schlechta, if f cannot be constructed from
elementary operations. But, even if there exists such a con-
struction, showing that it is indeed the case might well be a
difficult problem.
We can even go further combining universal (not existen-
tial) quantifiers and functions like f . For instance, suppose
G is a set of functions from P(V) to P(V) and consider the
following condition:
(C3) ∀ f ∈ G, ∀ V,W ∈ U, f(V )|((V ∪W )|W ) = ∅.
Then, (C3) cannot characterize O. Indeed, suppose (C3)
characterizesO. Then, take n = 4 and Φ such that
(V1, . . . , V4,W1, . . . ,W4, X1, . . . , X4) ∈ Φ iff
∀ f ∈ G, if


V1, V2 ∈ U,
V3 = V1 ∪ V2,
W3 = V2,
V4 = f(V1),
W4 = X3,
then X4 = ∅.
Then, 〈4,Φ〉 is a normal characterization of O. The easy
proof is left to the reader. On the other hand, (C3) is not
excluded by Schlechta.
Finally, a good example of a condition which is not ex-
cluded (neither by us nor by Schlechta) is of course the ar-
bitrary big loop condition (|loop).
Impossibility results
We provide our first impossibility result. It generalizes
Proposition 4.2.11 of (Schlechta 2004). Our proof will be
based on a slight adaptation of a particular pseudo-distance
invented by Schlechta (called “Hamster Wheel”).
Proposition 15 Let V be an infinite set, N the set of all
symmetric IR positive TIR distance operators from P(V)2
to P(V), and O a set of distance operators from P(V)2 to
P(V) such that N ⊆ O.
Then, there does not exist a normal characterization of O.
Proof Suppose the contrary, i.e. suppose there is n ∈ N+
and a relation Φ on P(V)3n such that
(0) for every binary operator | on P(V), we have | ∈ O iff
∀ V1, . . . , Vn, W1, . . . ,Wn ⊆ V ,
(V1, . . . , Vn, W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|W1, . . . , Vn|Wn) ∈ Φ.
As V is infinite, there are distinct v1, . . . , vm, w1, . . . , wm
in V , with m = n+ 3.
Let X = {v1, . . . , vm, w1, . . . , wm}.
LetD be the pseudo-distance on V such thatD = 〈R, <, d〉,
where< is the usual order on R and d is the function defined
as follows. Let v, w ∈ V . Consider the cases that follow:
Case 1: v = w.
Case 2: v 6= w.
Case 2.1: {v, w} 6⊆ X .
Case 2.2: {v, w} ⊆ X .
Case 2.2.1: {v, w} ⊆ {v1, . . . , vm}.
Case 2.2.2: {v, w} ⊆ {w1, . . . , wm}.
Case 2.2.3: ∃ i, j ∈ [1,m], {v, w} = {vi, wj}.
Case 2.2.3.1: i = j.
Case 2.2.3.2: abs(i− j) ∈ {1,m− 1}.
Case 2.2.3.3: 1 < abs(i− j) < m− 1.
Then,
d(v, w) =


0 if Case 1 holds;
1 if Case 2.1 holds;
1.1 if Case 2.2.1 holds;
1.1 if Case 2.2.2 holds;
1.4 if Case 2.2.3.1 holds;
2 if Case 2.2.3.2 holds;
1.2 if Case 2.2.3.3 holds.
Note that D is essentially, but not exactly, the Hamster
Wheel of (Schlechta 2004). The main difference is Case 2.1,
which was not treated by Schlechta. The reader can find a
picture of D in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A slight adaptation of Hamster Wheel.
Let | be the binary operator on P(V) such that ∀ V,W ⊆ V ,
V |W =
{
{wm} if V = {vm, v1},W = {wm, w1};
{vm} if V = {wm, w1},W = {vm, v1};
V |DW otherwise.
The difference between | and |D is strong enough so that:
(1) | is not a distance operator.
The proof will be given later. Thus, | 6∈ O. Thus, by (0):
(2) ∃V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn ⊆ V ,
(V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|W1, . . . , Vn|Wn) 6∈ Φ.
In addition, we took m sufficiently big so that:
(3) ∃ r ∈ [1,m− 1] such that
∀ i ∈ [1, n], {Vi,Wi} 6= {{vr, vr+1}, {wr, wr+1}}.
We will give the proof later.
Let |′ be the binary operator on P(V) such that ∀V,W ⊆ V ,
V |′W =
{
{wr+1} if V = {vr, vr+1},W = {wr, wr+1};
{vr+1} if V = {wr, wr+1},W = {vr, vr+1};
V |W otherwise.
The difference between |′ and | is “invisible” for Φ.
More formally, ∀ i ∈ [1, n], Vi|′Wi = Vi|Wi.
The proof of this is obvious by (3).
Therefore, by (2), we get:
(V1, . . . , Vn, W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|′W1, . . . , Vn|′Wn) 6∈ Φ.
Thus, by (0), we obtain:
(4) |′ 6∈ O.
But, at the same time, there is a convenient pseudo-distance
that represents |′. Indeed, let D′ be the pseudo-distance on
V such that D′ = 〈R, <, d′〉, where d′ is the function such
that ∀ v, w ∈ V ,
d′(v, w) =
{
1.3 if ∃i ∈ [r + 1,m], {v, w} = {vi, wi};
d(v, w) otherwise.
Then, we will show:
(5) |′ = |D′ .
But, D′ is obviously symmetric, IR, and positive.
In addition, D′ is TIR, because D′ is IR and
∀ v, w ∈ V , d′(v, w) = 0 or 1 ≤ d′(v, w) ≤ 2.
Thus, |′ is a symmetric IR positive TIR distance operator.
Consequently, |′ ∈ N and thus
(6) |′ ∈ O.
So, we get a final contradiction by (4) and (6).
Proof of (1). Suppose the contrary, i.e. suppose there
is a pseudo-distance S = 〈C,≺, g〉 on V such that | = |S .
Then, we will show:
(1.1) ∀ i ∈ [1,m− 1], g(vi, wi) = g(vi+1, wi+1).
On the other hand, we will show:
(1.2) g(vm, wm) ≺ g(v1, w1).
But, by (1.1) and (1.2), we get an obvious contradiction.
Proof of (1.1). Suppose i ∈ [1,m− 1]. Then:
{vi, vi+1}|S{wi, wi+1} = {vi, vi+1}|D{wi, wi+1} =
{wi, wi+1}.
Case 1: g(vi, wi) ≺ g(vi+1, wi+1).
We have {vi}|S{wi, wi+1} = {vi}|D{wi, wi+1} = {wi}.
Thus, wi+1 6∈ {vi}|S{wi, wi+1}.
Therefore, g(vi, wi) ≺ g(vi, wi+1).
Thus, wi+1 6∈ {vi, vi+1}|S{wi, wi+1}, which is impossible.
Case 2: g(vi+1, wi+1) ≺ g(vi, wi).
We have {vi+1}|S{wi, wi+1} = {vi+1}|D{wi, wi+1} =
{wi+1}.
Therefore, wi 6∈ {vi+1}|S{wi, wi+1}.
Consequently, g(vi+1, wi+1) ≺ g(vi+1, wi).
Thus, wi 6∈ {vi, vi+1}|S{wi, wi+1}, which is impossible.
Case 3: g(vi, wi) 6≺ g(vi+1, wi+1) and g(vi+1, wi+1) 6≺
g(vi, wi).
Then, as ≺ is total, g(vi, wi) = g(vi+1, wi+1).
Proof of (1.2). We have {vm, v1}|S{wm, w1} =
{vm, v1}|{wm, w1} = {wm}.
Therefore, w1 6∈ {vm, v1}|S{wm, w1}. Thus:
∃ v ∈ {vm, v1}, ∃ w ∈ {wm, w1}, g(v, w) ≺ g(v1, w1).
Case 1: g(vm, wm) ≺ g(v1, w1). We are done.
Case 2: g(vm, w1) ≺ g(v1, w1).
We have {vm}|S{wm, w1} = {vm}|D{wm, w1} = {wm}.
Therefore, w1 6∈ {vm}|S{wm, w1}.
Thus, g(vm, wm) ≺ g(vm, w1).
Thus, by transitivity of ≺, g(vm, wm) ≺ g(v1, w1).
Case 3: g(v1, wm) ≺ g(v1, w1).
Then, {v1}|S{wm, w1} = {wm}.
However, {v1}|S{wm, w1} = {v1}|D{wm, w1} = {w1},
which is impossible.
Case 4: g(v1, w1) ≺ g(v1, w1).
Impossible by irreflexivity of ≺.
Proof of (3). For all s ∈ [1,m− 1], define:
Is := {i ∈ [1, n] : {Vi,Wi} = {{vs, vs+1}, {ws, ws+1}}}.
Suppose the opposite of what we want to show, i.e. suppose
∀ s ∈ [1,m− 1], Is 6= ∅.
As v1, . . . , vm, w1, . . . , wm are distinct, ∀ s, t ∈ [1,m− 1],
if s 6= t, then Is ∩ It = ∅.
Therefore, m− 1 ≤ |I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Im−1|.
On the other hand, ∀ s ∈ [1,m− 1], Is ⊆ [1, n].
Thus, |I1 ∪ . . . ∪ Im−1| ≤ n.
Thus, m− 1 ≤ n, which is impossible as m = n+ 3.
Proof of (5). Let V,W ⊆ V .
Case 1: V = {vr, vr+1} and W = {wr, wr+1}.
Then, V |′W = {wr+1} = V |D′W .
Case 2: V = {wr, wr+1} and W = {vr, vr+1}.
Then, V |′W = {vr+1} = V |D′W .
Case 3: V = {vm, v1} and W = {wm, w1}.
Then, V |′W = V |W = {wm} = V |D′W .
Case 4: V = {wm, w1} and W = {vm, v1}.
Then, V |′W = V |W = {vm} = V |D′W .
Case 5: {V,W} 6∈
{{{vr, vr+1}, {wr, wr+1}}, {{vm, v1}, {wm, w1}}}.
Then, V |′W = V |W = V |DW .
Case 5.1: V = ∅ or W = ∅.
Then, V |DW = ∅ = V |D′W .
Case 5.2: V ∩W 6= ∅.
Then, V |DW = V ∩W = V |D′W .
Case 5.3: V 6= ∅, W 6= ∅, and V ∩W = ∅.
Case 5.3.1: V 6⊆ X .
Then, V |DW = W = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2: V ⊆ X .
Case 5.3.2.1: W 6⊆ X .
Then, V |DW = W \X = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2: W ⊆ X .
Case 5.3.2.2.1: V 6⊆ {v1, . . . , vm} and V 6⊆ {w1, . . . , wm}.
Then, V |DW = W = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.2: V ⊆ {v1, . . . vm} and W 6⊆ {w1, . . . wm}.
Then, V |DW = W ∩ {v1, . . . , vm} = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.3: V ⊆ {v1, . . . vm} and W ⊆ {w1, . . . wm}.
Case 5.3.2.2.3.1: ∃ vi ∈ V , ∃ wj ∈ W ,
1 < abs(i− j) < m− 1.
Then, V |DW =
{wj ∈W : ∃ vi ∈ V , 1 < abs(i− j) < m− 1} = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2: ∀ vi ∈ V , ∀ wj ∈ W ,
abs(i− j) ∈ {0, 1,m− 1}.
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.1: |V ∪W | ≥ 5.
As m ≥ 4, ∃ vi ∈ V , ∃ wj ∈ W , 1 < abs(i− j) < m− 1,
which is impossible.
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2: |V ∪W | ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2.1: {k ∈ [1,m] : vk ∈ V,wk ∈W} = ∅.
Then, V |DW = W = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2.2: ∃ i ∈ [1,m] such that
{k ∈ [1,m] : vk ∈ V,wk ∈ W} = {i}.
Then, V |DW = {wi} = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2.3: ∃ i, j ∈ [1,m] such that i < j and
{k ∈ [1,m] : vk ∈ V and wk ∈W} = {i, j}.
Then, V = {vi, vj} and W = {wi, wj}.
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2.3.1: r < i or j ≤ r.
Then, V |DW = {wi, wj} = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2.3.2: i ≤ r < j.
We have abs(i− j) ∈ {1,m− 1}. Thus, 〈V, W 〉 ∈
{〈{vr, vr+1}, {wr, wr+1}〉, 〈{v1, vm}, {w1, wm}〉},
which is impossible.
Case 5.3.2.2.3.2.2.4: |{k ∈ [1,m] : vk ∈ V,wk ∈W}| ≥ 3.
Then, |V ∪W | ≥ 6, which is impossible.
Case 5.3.2.2.4: V ⊆ {w1, . . . wm} and W 6⊆ {v1, . . . vm}.
Then, V |DW = W ∩ {w1, . . . , wm} = V |D′W .
Case 5.3.2.2.5: V ⊆ {w1, . . . wm} and W ⊆ {v1, . . . vm}.
Similar to Case 5.3.2.2.3.
We extend the negative results to the “liberal” and Ham-
ming properties. The proof will be based on an adaptation
of the Hamster Wheel. Note that the Hamming distance is
a realistic distance which has been investigated by many re-
searchers. This strengthen the importance of Proposition 16
below in the sense that not only abstract but also concrete
cases do not admit a normal characterization.
Proposition 16 LetL = 〈A, C〉 be a propositional language
withA infinite and countable,M a matrix on L, V the set of
all M-valuations,N the set of all symmetric, HIR, liberally
IR, liberally positive, and liberally TIR distance operators
from P(V)2 to P(V), andO a set of distance operators from
P(V)2 to P(V) such that N ⊆ O.
Then, there does not exist a normal characterization of O.
Proof Suppose the contrary, i.e. suppose there are n ∈ N+
and a relation Φ on P(V)3n such that
(0) for every binary operator | on P(V), we have | ∈ O iff
∀ V1, . . . , Vn, W1, . . . ,Wn ⊆ V ,
(V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|W1, . . . , Vn|Wn) ∈ Φ.
As A is infinite, there are distinct p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qm in
A, with m = n+ 3.
Let’s pose M = 〈T,D, f〉.
As D 6= ∅ and T \D 6= ∅, there are distinct 0, 1 ∈ T .
Now, ∀ i ∈ [1,m], let vi be the M-valuation that assigns 1
to pi and 0 to each other atom of A.
Similarly, ∀ i ∈ [1,m], let wi be the M-valuation that as-
signs 1 to qi and 0 to each other atom of A.
Let X = {v1, . . . , vm, w1 . . . , wm}.
Note that ∀ v, w ∈ X , with v 6= w, we have |h(v, w)| = 2.
Finally, let D be the pseudo-distance on V such that D =
〈R ∪ {|N|},≺, d〉, where ≺ and d are defined as follows.
Let c, c′ ∈ R∪{|N|}. Then, c ≺ c′ iff (c, c′ ∈ R and c < c′)
or (c ∈ R and c′ = |N|).
Let v, w ∈ V and consider the cases which follow:
Case 1: v = w.
Case 2: v 6= w.
Case 2.1: {v, w} 6⊆ X .
Case 2.1.1: |h(v, w)| = 1.
Case 2.1.2: |h(v, w)| ≥ 2.
Case 2.2: {v, w} ⊆ X .
Case 2.2.1: {v, w} ⊆ {v1, . . . , vm}.
Case 2.2.2: {v, w} ⊆ {w1, . . . , wm}.
Case 2.2.3: ∃ i, j ∈ [1,m], {v, w} = {vi, wj}.
Case 2.2.3.1: i = j.
Case 2.2.3.2: abs(i− j) ∈ {1,m− 1}.
Case 2.2.3.3: 1 < abs(i− j) < m− 1.
Then,
d(v, w) =


0 if Case 1 holds;
1.4 if Case 2.1.1 holds;
|h(v, w)| if Case 2.1.2 holds;
2.1 if Case 2.2.1 holds;
2.1 if Case 2.2.2 holds;
2.4 if Case 2.2.3.1 holds;
2.5 if Case 2.2.3.2 holds;
2.2 if Case 2.2.3.3 holds.
Note that D is an adaptation of the Hamster Wheel of
(Schlechta 2004). The reader can find a picture of D in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: An adaptation of Hamster Wheel.
Let | be the binary operator on P(V) defined as follows.
Let V,W ⊆ V and consider the cases that follow:
Case 1: ∀v ∈ V , ∀w ∈W, {v, w} ⊆ X or 3 ≤ |h(v, w)|.
Case 1.1: V ∩X = {vm, v1} and W ∩X = {wm, w1}.
Case 1.2: V ∩X = {wm, w1} and W ∩X = {vm, v1}.
Case 1.3: {V ∩X,W ∩X} 6= {{vm, v1}, {wm, w1}}.
Case 2: ∃ v ∈ V , ∃w ∈W , {v, w} 6⊆ X and |h(v, w)| < 3.
Then,
V |W =
{
{wm} if Case 1.1 holds;
{vm} if Case 1.2 holds;
V |DW if Case 1.3 or Case 2 holds.
The difference between | and |D is sufficiently strong so that
| is not a distance operator. The proof is verbatim the same
as for (1) in the proof of Proposition 15.
Consequently, | 6∈ O, thus, by (0), we get that
(1) ∃V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn ⊆ V ,
(V1, . . . , Vn,W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|W1, . . . , Vn|Wn) 6∈ Φ.
Moreover, we chose m sufficiently big so that:
(2) ∃ r ∈ [1,m− 1], ∀ i ∈ [1, n],
{Vi ∩X,Wi ∩X} 6= {{vr, vr+1}, {wr, wr+1}}.
The proof is verbatim the same as for (3) in the proof of
Proposition 15, except that Vi and Wi are replaced by Vi∩X
and Wi ∩X .
Let |′ be the binary operator on P(V) defined as follows.
Let V,W ⊆ V and consider the cases that follow:
Case 1: ∀v ∈ V , ∀w ∈W , {v, w} ⊆ X or 3 ≤ |h(v, w)|.
Case 1.1: V ∩X = {vr, vr+1} and W ∩X = {wr, wr+1}.
Case 1.2: V ∩X = {wr, wr+1} and W ∩X = {vr, vr+1}.
Case 1.3: {V ∩X,W ∩X} 6= {{vr, vr+1}, {wr, wr+1}}.
Case 2: ∃ v ∈ V , ∃w ∈W , {v, w} 6⊆ X and |h(v, w)| < 3.
Then,
V |′W =
{
{wr+1} if Case 1.1 holds;
{vr+1} if Case 1.2 holds;
V |W if Case 1.3 or Case 2 holds.
The difference between |′ and | is “invisible” for Φ.
More formally, ∀ i ∈ [1, n], Vi|′Wi = Vi|Wi.
The proof is obvious by (2). Thus, by (1), we get:
(V1, . . . , Vn, W1, . . . ,Wn, V1|′W1, . . . , Vn|′Wn) 6∈ Φ.
Therefore, by (0), we get:
(3) |′ 6∈ O.
But, in parallel, there is a convenient pseudo-distance that
represents |′. Indeed, let D′ be the pseudo-distance on V
such that D′ = 〈R ∪ {|N|},≺, d′〉, where d′ is the function
such that ∀ v, w ∈ V ,
d′(v, w) =
{
2.3 if ∃i ∈ [r + 1,m], {v, w} = {vi, wi};
d(v, w) otherwise.
Note that ∀ v, w ∈ V , we have:
|h(v, w)| ∈ N iff d(v, w) ∈ R iff d′(v, w) ∈ R.
Thus, |h(v, w)| = |N| iff d(v, w) = |N| iff d′(v, w) = |N|.
Note again that ∀ v, w ∈ V , with |h(v, w)| ∈ N, we have:
|h(v, w)| ≤ d′(v, w) ≤ d(v, w) ≤ |h(v, w)| + 0.5.
We will show:
(4) |′ = |D′ .
But, D′ is symmetric, liberally IR, and liberally positive.
In addition, we will show:
(5) D′ is HIR;
(6) D′ is liberally TIR.
So, |′ is a symmetric, liberally IR, liberally positive, liberally
TIR, and HIR distance operator.
Therefore, |′ ∈ N and thus:
(7) |′ ∈ O.
Finally, (3) and (7) entail a contradiction.
Proof of (4). Let V,W ⊆ V .
Case 1: ∀v ∈ V , ∀w ∈W , {v, w} ⊆ X or 3 ≤ |h(v, w)|.
Case 1.1: V ∩X = {vr, vr+1} and W ∩X = {wr, wr+1}.
Then, V |′W = {wr+1} = V |D′W .
Case 1.2: V ∩X = {wr, wr+1} and W ∩X = {vr, vr+1}.
Then, V |′W = {vr+1} = V |D′W .
Case 1.3: V ∩X = {vm, v1} and W ∩X = {wm, w1}.
Then, V |′W = {wm} = V |D′W .
Case 1.4: V ∩X = {wm, w1} and W ∩X = {vm, v1}.
Then, V |′W = {vm} = V |D′W .
Case 1.5: {V ∩X,W ∩X} 6∈
{{{vm, v1}, {wm, w1}}, {{vr, vr+1}, {wr, wr+1}}}.
Then, V |′W = V |W = V |DW .
Case 1.5.1: V ∩W 6= ∅.
Then, V |DW = V ∩W = V |D′W .
Case 1.5.2: V ∩W = ∅.
Case 1.5.2.1: V ∩X = ∅ or W ∩X = ∅.
Then, ∀ v ∈ V , ∀ w ∈W , d′(v, w) = d(v, w).
Therefore, V |DW = V |D′W .
Case 1.5.2.2: V ∩X 6= ∅ and W ∩X 6= ∅.
Then, we will show:
(4.1) V |DW = V ∩X |DW ∩X ;
(4.2) V |D′W = V ∩X |D′W ∩X .
But, we have V ∩X |DW ∩X = V ∩X |D′W ∩X .
The proof of this is verbatim the same as for Case 5.3.2.2,
in the proof of (5), in the proof of Proposition 15, except
that V and W are replaced by V ∩X and W ∩X .
Case 2: ∃ v ∈ V , ∃w ∈ W , {v, w} 6⊆ X and |h(v, w)| ≤ 2.
Then, V |′W = V |W = V |DW .
Case 2.1. V ∩W 6= ∅.
Then, V |DW = V ∩W = V |D′W .
Case 2.2. V ∩W = ∅.
Case 2.2.1. ∃ v′ ∈ V , ∃ w′ ∈W , |h(v, w)| = 1.
Then, V |DW = {w ∈ W : ∃ v ∈ V, |h(v, w)| = 1} =
V |D′W .
Case 2.2.2. ∀ v′ ∈ V , ∀ w′ ∈W , |h(v, w)| ≥ 2.
Then, V |DW =
{w ∈ W : ∃ v ∈ V, {v, w} 6⊆ X and |h(v, w)| = 2} =
V |D′W .
Proof of (4.1). Direction: “⊆”.
Let w ∈ V |DW .
Then, ∃ v ∈ V , ∀ v′ ∈ V , ∀ w′ ∈W , d(v, w)  d(v′, w′).
Case 1: {v, w} ⊆ X .
Then, w ∈ V ∩X |DW ∩X .
Case 2: {v, w} 6⊆ X .
We have ∃ v′ ∈ V ∩X and ∃ w′ ∈W ∩X .
In addition, d(v′, w′) ∈ R and d(v′, w′) ≤ 2.5.
Case 2.1: |h(v, w)| = |N|.
Then, d(v, w) = |N|.
Therefore, d(v′, w′) ≺ d(v, w), which is impossible.
Case 2.2: |h(v, w)| ∈ N.
Then, d(v, w) ∈ R and 3 ≤ |h(v, w)| ≤ d(v, w).
Therefore, d(v′, w′) < d(v, w).
Thus, d(v′, w′) ≺ d(v, w), which is impossible.
Direction: “⊇”.
Let w ∈ V ∩X |DW ∩X .
Then, ∃ v ∈ V ∩X such that
∀ v′ ∈ V ∩X , ∀ w′ ∈W ∩X , d(v, w)  d(v′, w′).
Let v′ ∈ V , w′ ∈W .
Case 1: {v′, w′} ⊆ X .
Then, d(v, w)  d(v′, w′).
Case 2: {v′, w′} 6⊆ X .
As v, w ∈ X , we have d(v, w) ∈ R and d(v, w) ≤ 2.5.
Case 2.1: |h(v′, w′)| = |N|.
Then, d(v′, w′) = |N|. Thus, d(v, w) ≺ d(v′, w′).
Case 2.2: |h(v′, w′)| ∈ N.
Then, d(v′, w′) ∈ R and 3 ≤ |h(v′, w′)| ≤ d(v′, w′).
Therefore, d(v, w) < d(v′, w′).
Thus, d(v, w) ≺ d(v′, w′).
Consequently, in all cases, d(v, w)  d(v′, w′).
Thus, w ∈ V |DW .
Proof of (4.2). Verbatim the proof of (4.1), except
that |D and d are replaced by |D′ and d′.
Proof of (5). Let v, w, x ∈ V with |h(v, w)| < |h(v, x)|.
Case 1: |h(v, x)| = |N|.
Then, |h(v, w)| ∈ N.
Thus, d′(v, w) ∈ R and d′(v, x) = |N|.
Therefore, d′(v, w) ≺ d′(v, x).
Case 2: |h(v, x)| ∈ N.
Then, |h(v, w)| ∈ N.
Therefore, d′(v, x) ∈ R, d′(v, w) ∈ R, and d′(v, w) ≤
|h(v, w)| + 0.5 < |h(v, w)|+ 1 ≤ |h(v, x)| ≤ d′(v, x).
Thus, d′(v, w) ≺ d′(v, x).
Proof of (6). Let v, w, x ∈ V .
Note that h(v, x) ⊆ h(v, w) ∪ h(w, x).
Therefore, |h(v, x)| ≤ |h(v, w) ∪ h(w, x)|.
Case 1: d′(v, x) = |N|.
Then, |h(v, x)| = |N|.
Now, suppose d′(v, w) ∈ R and d′(w, x) ∈ R.
Then, |h(v, w)|, |h(w, x)| ∈ N.
Thus, |h(v, w) ∪ h(w, x)| ∈ N.
Therefore, |h(v, x)| ∈ N, which is impossible.
Thus, d′(v, w) = |N| or d′(w, x) = |N|.
Case 2: d′(v, x), d′(v, w), d′(w, x) ∈ R.
Case 2.1: |h(v, w)| = 0 or |h(w, x)| = 0. Trivial.
Case 2.2: |h(v, w)| ≥ 1 and |h(w, x)| ≥ 1.
Case 2.2.1: |h(v, w)| ≥ 2 or |h(w, x)| ≥ 2.
Case 2.2.1.1: |h(v, x)| ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Then, d′(v, x) ≤ |h(v, x)| + 0.5 ≤ 2.5 < 3 ≤
|h(v, w)| + |h(w, x)| ≤ d′(v, w) + d′(w, x).
Case 2.2.1.2: |h(v, x)| ≥ 3.
Then, d′(v, x) = |h(v, x)| ≤ |h(v, w)| + |h(w, x)| ≤
d′(v, w) + d′(w, x).
Case 2.2.2: |h(v, w)| = 1 and |h(w, x)| = 1.
Case 2.2.2.1: |h(v, x)| ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Then, d′(v, x) ≤ |h(v, x)| + 0.5 ≤ 2.5 < 1.4 + 1.4 =
d′(v, w) + d′(w, x).
Case 2.2.2.2: |h(v, x)| ≥ 3.
Then, |h(v, x)| > |h(v, w)| + |h(w, x)|, impossible.
Conclusion
We laid the focus on the question to know whether (⋆loop)
can be replaced by a finite condition in Proposition 13. Ob-
viously, the presence of (⋆loop) is due to the presence of
(|loop). So, to solve the problem one might attack its source,
i.e. try to replace (|loop) by a finite condition in Proposi-
tion 12. But, we showed in the present paper that for families
of distance operators, there is no normal characterization.
The symmetric family is concerned with this and therefore
(|loop) cannot be replaced by a finite and universally quan-
tified condition.
Now, we can go further. Indeed, there is a strong connex-
ion between the distance operators and the distance-based
revision operators. Lehmann et al. used this connexion to
get their results on the latter from their results on the former.
It is reasonable to think that the same thing can be done with
our negative results, i.e this paper can certainly be continued
in future work to show that for families of distance-based
revision operators, there is no normal characterization ei-
ther. For instance, the family which is symmetric, CP, and
DP might well be concerned with this, which suggests that
(⋆loop) cannot be replaced by a finite and universally quan-
tified condition.
In addition, this direction for future work can still be fol-
lowed if we define the distance-based revision in a non-
classical framework. Indeed, as Lehmann et al. did, we
worked in a general framework. For instance, if we de-
fine the revision in the FOUR framework —FOUR is a
well-known paraconsistent logic from (Belnap 1977b) and
(Belnap 1977a) — then we can probably use the results of
(Lehmann, Magidor, & Schlechta 2001) and our results re-
spectively to show characterizations of revision operators
and show that they cannot be really improved.
Moreover, most of the approaches to belief revision treat
in a trivial way inconsistent sets of beliefs (if they are treated
at all). However, people may be rational despite inconsis-
tent beliefs (there may be overwhelming evidence for both
something and its contrary). There are also inconsistencies
in principle impossible to eliminate like the “Paradox of the
Preface” (Makinson 1965). The latter says that a conscien-
tious author has reasons to believe that everything written in
his book is true. But, because of human imperfection, he is
sure that his book contains errors, and thus that something
must be false. Consequently, he has (in the absolute sense)
both reasons to believe that everything is true and that some-
thing is false. So, principles of rational belief revision must
work on inconsistent sets of beliefs. Standard approaches to
belief revision (e.g. AGM) all fail to do this as they are based
on classical logic. Paraconsistent logics (like e.g. FOUR)
could be the bases of more adequate approaches.
Another advantage of such approaches is that they will
not be forced to eliminate a contradiction even when there is
no good way to do it. Contradictions could be tolerated until
new information eventually comes to justify one or another
way of elimination.
Finally, such approaches will benefit from an extended
field of application which includes multi-agent systems
where the agents can have individually inconsistent beliefs.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that these perspectives for be-
lief revision can be transposed to belief merging.
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